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1. Introduction
The sharp increase in wage and earnings inequality in the United States
over the last 30 years is a well-documented fact. Katz and Autor (1999)
summarize the findings of a large body of empirical research on this
topic by concluding that "many researchers using a variety of data sets—
including both household and establishment surveys—have found that
wage inequality and skill differentials in earnings increased sharply in
the United States from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s" (p. 1467). The
objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare consequences of this
sharp change in the wage distribution and the associated change in the
earnings distribution.
1
Our interest in welfare immediately forces us to look beyond the distri-
bution of current wages. If a household's economic welfare depends on
consumption and leisure enjoyed over that household's lifetime, as com-
monly assumed by economists, then an analysis of the welfare conse-
quences of increasing wage inequality has to determine how current
wages are related to disposable income, lifetime consumption, and hours
worked. First, even if current wages perfectly determine lifetime earnings,
We thank Steven Davis, Mark Gertler, Ken Rogoff, and Kjetil Storesletten and seminar par-
ticipants at UCLA and at the 2003 NBER Macroeconomics Annual conference for their use-
ful comments. Krueger thanks the National Science Foundation for financial support under
grant SES 0004376. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
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1. Our data stretches from 1972 to 2000. When we refer to the increase in inequality over the
last 30 years, we mean the long-run trend within our sample period. Our data presented
later show that inequality has not increased at a uniform pace throughout the last 30 years.84 • KRUEGER & PERRI
transfers among extended family members, friends, or the government
may augment disposable income and thus increase consumption oppor-
tunities of families. Second, if a significant fraction of the variations in
wages, and thus income, is due to variations in its transitory component
and if some forms of credit markets are available to households, current
wages or current income may not be the appropriate measure of lifetime
resources of these households. This suggests that the distribution of
consumption is a better indicator of the distribution of welfare. In addi-
tion, the distribution of consumption still does not constitute a suffi-
cient statistic for the welfare distribution because high consumption in
the light of low wages may be realized at the expense of long working
hours and thus little leisure for household members. The objective of
our analysis is to take all these elements into consideration in evaluat-
ing the welfare consequences of the increase in inequality in the United
States.
2
Our analysis is divided into two parts. In the first part we use data from
the Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey for the years 1972-2000 to docu-
ment the evolution of the U.S. cross-sectional variability of individual
wages, household total earnings and disposable earnings, hours worked,
and consumption. We find a substantial increase in wage inequality, total
earnings inequality, and disposable earnings inequality. Total household
earnings inequality increases slightly less than individual wage inequal-
ity, suggesting that longer hours might be used to compensate partly for
declines in relative wages. We also find that inequality in disposable earn-
ings (which include government taxes and transfers) increases by more
than inequality in earnings, suggesting a reduction in the redistributive
impact of these public policies. Despite all these developments, consump-
tion inequality displays a very modest increase.
An important part of our analysis is the decomposition of the increase
in cross-sectional inequality in the data into an increase in differences
(estimated as persistent) between groups (e.g., college-educated and high
school-educated households) and into an increase in idiosyncratic differ-
ences (estimated as less persistent) within each group (e.g., employed and
unemployed).
In the second part of the paper, first we estimate stochastic processes for
household earnings, consumption, and hours worked that are consistent
with the evolution of the empirical cross-sectional distributions and with
2. Obviously a full evaluation of the welfare consequences of inequality is a complex task
that depends on a large number of additional economic and social factors not considered
here. Also, throughout the paper, we will treat long-run growth trends in consumption
and leisure as orthogonal to changes in inequality. This approach implies that we will
ignore all the effects that changes in inequality might have on these trends.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 85
one-year relative mobility matrices from the CE. Then a standard lifetime
utility framework, together with our estimates of the stochastic processes
for the relevant variables, is employed to deduce the magnitude of wel-
fare losses from increased inequality. In particular, our analysis focuses on
the welfare consequences of two distinct aspects of the increase in
inequality: (1) persistently higher differences between groups reduce rel-
ative mean resources of some groups and increase them for others, and
(2) higher volatility within one group increases the risk faced by all
groups of the population. Both aspects potentially have large welfare
impacts; the upshot of our analysis is that the second aspect significantly
affects the welfare of all groups, other things being equal, and that the first
aspect determines the exact distribution of these welfare effects, reinforc-
ing them for groups that do poorly and mitigating (or even offsetting)
them for groups that do better. Our framework allows us to quantify the
size of the welfare losses for many education and sex groups of the U.S.
population. The estimates obtained using consumption and leisure
processes are fairly robust to changes in the risk aversion parameter and
are as large as 6% of lifetime consumption for some groups.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly relate
our study to the existing literature. The main descriptive statistics of the
CE wage, earning, hours, and consumption distributions are summarized
and interpreted in Section 3. The quantitative welfare analysis based on
the empirical findings in that section is contained in Section 4, and Section
5 concludes. Additional details about the data used in the main body of
the paper are discussed in the data appendix (Section 6).
2. Related Literature
What are the behavioral and welfare consequences of changes in the wage
structure? Several strands of the existing literature provide partial
answers to this question. First, a sizable literature, summarized in
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), investigates the behavioral response of
labor supply to changes in wages and the employment status of the pri-
mary earner. We explicitly study hours worked by several members of the
household, so the literature on the added worker effect, which studies the
labor supply response of a spouse to the primary worker's job loss or job
displacement, is relevant to our work. Whereas most studies find small
effects (see, for example, Heckman and MaCurdy [1980] and Cullen and
Gruber [2000]), Stephens (2002) argues that, once the labor supply
response of spouses to an expected job loss of their partners and to per-
manently lower wages of partners following their displacement are taken
into account, this response may be quite sizable.86 • KRUEGER & PERRI
Second, if changes in the wage structure translate into changes in a
household's income process, how do these changes affect consumption?
The complete consumption insurance hypothesis has a very strong pre-
diction for the risk-sharing behavior among households. Under this
hypothesis, the ratio of marginal utilities between two households is con-
stant across time and states, even when individuals face idiosyncratic
income uncertainty.
3 If preferences of all individuals are identical and can
be represented by a constant relative risk aversion utility function that is
separable across time and between consumption and leisure, then indi-
vidual consumption growth rates move in tandem with aggregate con-
sumption growth rates, unless tastes shift. Conditional on aggregate
consumption growth rates, individual consumption growth rates would
be uncorrelated with individual income growth rates, whether or not
income fluctuations are temporary or permanent, expected or unex-
pected. As a consequence of full consumption insurance, the increase in
variability of the idiosyncratic part of income (and if there is consump-
tion insurance between observably distinct groups, even the increase in
between-group variability) in itself does not have adverse welfare conse-
quences. This hypothesis has been extensively tested empirically.
Examples include Altug and Miller (1990); Mace (1991); Cochrane (1991);
Nelson (1994); Townsend (1994); Attanasio and Davis (1996); and
Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996), with results that tend to reject the
full consumption insurance hypothesis.
Full consumption insurance requires a sophisticated transfer or insur-
ance system between individual households. (It can be achieved, for
example, with a full set of Arrow securities that pay out contingent on
individual income shocks.) In contrast, the second strand of the literature
studying the map between income and consumption takes the perma-
nent income hypothesis as a point of departure, which envisions a con-
sumer in isolation attempting to self-insure against income fluctuations.
The welfare consequences of increased income instability in this para-
digm depend crucially on whether the income shocks are temporary or
permanent because transitory shocks can be easily smoothed using
(dis)saving. Hall and Mishkin (1982) decompose income into its transi-
tory and permanent components and investigate whether, in fact, house-
holds smooth transitory income shocks to a higher degree than they
smooth permanent income shocks. Blundell and Preston (1998) use this
idea and income and consumption data to infer the extent to which
income shocks are permanent. Finally, Heathcote et al. (2003) build
a model based on the permanent income hypothesis to assess the wel-
3. See, e.g., Deaton (1992), Chapter 1.3.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 87
fare consequences of the recent increase in wage inequality. They use
model-predicted consumption paths implied by estimated wage
processes in their welfare calculations.
Common to both strands of the literature is that researchers interpret
consumption data through the lens of a particular economic model of
financial markets (a complete set of contingent claims for the former
strand, a single uncontingent bond in the latter). Finally, a descriptive
literature does not take a stand on a particular economic model but
rather documents changes in income and consumption distributions
(and possibly interprets them). Examples include Cutler and Katz
(1991a, 1991b), Johnson and Shipp (1991), Mayer and Jencks (1993),
Johnson and Smeeding (1998), and Slesnick (1993, 2001).
4 In addition,
the papers by Attanasio and Davis (1996), Dynarski and Gruber (1997),
and us (Krueger and Perri, 2002) provide extensive descriptive analysis
of cross-sectional household consumption data, but then go on to inter-
pret and analyze these data from the viewpoint of an underlying theo-
retical model. Our approach will mostly follow this last descriptive
tradition. The only theory we use is a period budget constraint to
organize our data and an intertemporal utility function to evaluate the
welfare consequences of changes in the wage distribution, in conjunc-
tion with observed consumption and leisure choices from the data
directly.
Our thought experiment of assessing the welfare consequences of
increased wage, income, and consumption inequality using microcon-
sumption data is similar in spirit to the exercise conducted by Attanasio
and Davis (1996). They quantify the welfare losses implied by incom-
plete consumption insurance between different education and cohort
groups, relative to the complete consumption insurance benchmark.
Behind the veil of ignorance (i.e., before knowing what cohort-education
group one belongs to), agents have to be compensated by an increase of
1 to 3% of consumption (at all dates, in all states) for imperfect con-
sumption insurance. In our analysis we study, in addition to imperfect
between-group insurance, the welfare implications of within-group con-
sumption variability and we document how the welfare consequences
are distributed across the population (that is, we look once the veil of
ignorance has been lifted). We find welfare losses of increased con-
sumption inequality of similar magnitude for a large part of the popu-
lation and conclude with Attanasio and Davis (1996) that these costs
4. Even policy circles and the popular press are occupied with the distribution of consump-
tion. See Greenspan (1998) for an example of the former, and the book by Cox and Aim
(1999) for an example of the latter.KRUEGER & PERRI
are two orders of magnitude bigger than the costs of business cycles




Before assessing the welfare consequences of increasing wage and
income inequality, we want first to document the basic facts from the CE
data that link wages to the economic variables that enter the utility func-
tion in our welfare analysis, namely, consumption and leisure (that is, all
available nonsleep time minus hours worked per member of the house-
hold). A comment about our choice of the CE as our data source may be
appropriate at this time. For detailed information on U.S. individual
household consumption, the CE is the only available dataset. In addition,
we want to investigate changes in the distribution of welfare associated
with changes in the wage and earnings distribution, including the
within-group variation. Thus, synthetic cohort techniques that make it
feasible to combine several different datasets cannot be applied because
these techniques average out all within-group (idiosyncratic) variation in
the data.
6 The CE includes not only information about consumption, but
also about hours worked and income, and indirectly about wages. It has
a relatively small sample size (an average of 5000 households per quar-
ter) and a short panel dimension (1 year), but it is the only available
dataset that reports household-level observations for all economic vari-
ables needed for our study.
To organize the CE data we use a simple period-by-period budget con-
straint that reads, for an arbitrary household i, as:
where cit are expenditures on consumption, yit is income from all sources,
and sit is saving.
We divide net income yit of the household into labor income net of taxes
and capital income net of taxes. Let wages of household member j be
denoted by w^, and hours worked by that household member by hijt.
5. Krusell and Smith (1999), among others, use a model with many heterogenous agents to
document the distribution of this cost across different income and wealth classes and find
that the cost of business cycles is small for almost all population groups.
6. It needs to be acknowledged that with idiosyncratic variation, a potentially important
amount of measurement error is contained in our dataset, which synthetic cohort tech-
niques tend to average out. As long as the relative magnitude of these measurement errors
do not change over time, however, our estimates of the changes in idiosyncratic variabil-
ity of wages, earnings and consumption remain informative.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 89
Finally let tit denote direct labor income taxes paid by household i, and x „
denote government transfers. Therefore:
Vit = X
 Wijt ^ + X
 rikt
 aikt -ht + t it = tyit ~ tit +*it+ tyit
i *
Thus:
where lyit is labor earnings before taxes and kyit is capital income after
taxes.
In our previous work (Krueger and Perri [2002]), we documented a sig-
nificant increase in the cross-sectional variance of after-tax labor income
(henceforth disposable earnings, or simply earnings) lyit - tit + x it, without
a correspondingly large increase in the variance of consumption. The
cross-sectional variance of consumption is given by:
Var (cit) = Var(yit) + Var (sit) - 2Cov (yit, sit)
= Var(lyit- tit + xit) + Var(kyit) + Var(sit) + covariances
Thus, to explore how wage inequality is related to inequality in hours
worked and to consumption inequality, we have to explore (1) how wage
inequality is related to hours inequality and disposable earnings inequal-
ity and (2) how disposable earnings inequality is related to consumption
inequality (and thus inequality in savings).
3.1 FROM WAGE INEQUALITY TO DISPOSABLE EARNINGS
INEQUALITY
Disposable earnings of household i at date t are given by:
where ; indexes members of the household receiving earnings.
Throughout our empirical analysis, we will restrict ourselves to house-
holds for which / < 2. As Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and Katz and
Autor (1999) document and we confirm below, wage inequality has
increased significantly in the last 30 years. We also find that the inequal-
ity in wages translates in a quantitatively substantial way into inequality
of disposable earnings.
3.1.1 Wage Inequality In Figure 1, we plot the standard deviation of the
natural logarithm of weekly wages from the CE, measured as the weekly
earnings of the reference person of the household.
7 The figure shows a
7. The reference person in the CE is defined as the person who owns or rents the home in
which the household members reside.90 • KRUEGER & PERRI




quantitatively significant increase in wage inequality: the percentage
standard deviation of wages increases from around 55% in the early 1970s
to around 67% at the end of the 1990s. We select only households that are
classified as complete income respondents in the CE, that report positive
consumption expenditures for each quarter in which they are in the sam-
ple, and whose reference person is between 20 and 64 years of age and has
worked at least one week in the year. Also, to reduce measurement error,
we exclude households whose reference person reports a weekly wage
below $67, in constant 1982 dollars (equal to half of the 1982 minimum
wage based on a 40-hour workweek). Finally, because we are interested
in the welfare impact of the increase in wage dispersion, we divide the
wage of the reference person by the number of adult equivalents in the
household.
8
Note that our sample includes households with low wages that are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the increase in inequality (for example, households
8. The number of adult equivalents is computed using the census equivalence scale.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 91
whose reference person is not a full-time worker and households with
female reference persons).
9 On the other hand, households with a reference
person that never works during the year are not included in our wage dis-
tribution sample. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) argue that the number of
such households is large and increased throughout the 1990s; they use the
Current Population Survey (CPS) to impute wage data for individuals that
are out of the labor force. The small sample of the CE does not allow us to
follow the same procedure. We have consumption data for these house-
holds, however, and we will include them in the consumption distribution
sample so that our consumption-based welfare analysis will take into
account the effects of long jobless spells and labor force withdrawals
described by Juhn et al. (2002).
We want to compare briefly our wage inequality findings with previous
studies in the literature because some authors (for example, Cutler and
Katz, 1991a) have questioned the reliability of CE wage and income data.
To do so, we compute inequality measures in the CE for the wage distri-
bution of male reference persons who work at least 40 weeks for at least
35 hours per week, the same selection criteria used by Katz and Autor
(1999) to compute wage inequality measures for the Current Population
Survey (CPS) and by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2003) for the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
In Figure 2, we report the 90%-10% differential for male weekly log
wages in the CE and the CPS (see Figure 4 in Katz and Autor, 1999).
Notice that both the timing and the magnitude of the increase in inequal-
ity in the two samples are quite comparable. In Figure 3, we compare the
increase in the standard deviation of log wages in our sample with the
increase in the same measure in the CPS sample (Katz and Autor, 1999,
Table 1) and the PSID sample (Heathcote et al., 2003, Table 2).
1
0 The figure
confirms that both the timing and the magnitude of the increase in wage
inequality are similar across the three datasets.
1
1
3.1.2 Earnings Inequality Wage inequality may be accentuated or miti-
gated by the endogenous labor supply decisions of the members of the
9. This sample selection strategy was suggested to us by our discussant Steve Davis.
10. All the series in Figures 2 and 3 are based on wages per person and not on per-adult
equivalent wages (as the series in Figure 1).
11. Katz and Autor report only the standard deviation of log wages for 5 years. The level of
the standard deviations is very similar in the CE and CPS, while it is slightly higher in
the PSID (for example, in 1987 the standard deviation of log wages is 0.57 in the CE, 0.579
in the CPS, and 0.601 in the PSID). Small differences in levels are not surprising because
levels are affected by the different top-coding thresholds in the datasets and by the
potentially different extent of measurement error.92 • KRUEGER & PERRI
household. A decline in the primary earner's wage may induce other
members of the household to start working or to work longer hours (the
added worker effect). On the other hand, in the face of temporarily low
wages, the primary wage earner may decide to substitute and work less
today and work more in the future when wages have recovered. The map
between wage and labor income inequality is therefore determined by the
relative importance of these effects. Furthermore, changes in taxes and
transfers can reduce or magnify the effect of changes in wages on dispos-
able earnings. In Figure 4, we report inequality in total household earn-
ings, TijWijthijt, and in disposable household earnings, HjWijthijt - tit + Tit The sample we select is exactly the same as the one chosen to compute
wage inequality; as before, we divide every variable by the number of
adult equivalent members of the household.
Figure 4 shows that total earnings inequality increases by a slightly
smaller amount than wage inequality, consistent with moderate responses
of labor supply to wage changes. Notice also that, not surprisingly, given
the progressivity of the government tax and transfer system, disposable
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earnings inequality is significantly lower than inequality in total earnings.
The gap between total earnings and disposable earnings inequality has
declined over time. This decline suggests that the government tax and
transfer system may have become less progressive over our sample
period, which caused part of the increase in disposable earnings inequality.
Finally, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to understand
whether the increase in earnings inequality stems from an increase in
between- or within-group differences. The empirical decomposition we
employ is simple and widely used (see Katz and Autor, 1999). To control
for changes in the age and race composition of the population, first we
regress each cross section of the raw data of disposable earnings on a con-
stant, a quartic in the age of the household reference person and a race
dummy. The cross section of the residuals is denoted by yt = {In y!t},eI. By
construction yt has zero cross-sectional mean for every t, and each obser-
vation is interpreted as percentage deviations of earnings of household i
from the average earning of a household of the same age and the same
race.
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We then decompose each earning observation into a component y?t due
to observables (education and sex) and into a part due to unobservable,
purely idiosyncratic variation yft:
so that yit=yft y
dit.
n We chose education and sex to define groups because
the increase of the skill premium and the decline of the gender gap are the
two most important determinants of the changes of between-group earn-
ings inequality in the last 30 years. We then assume that the unobservable
idiosyncratic component of earnings is orthogonal to the observable,
common-group component of earnings, so that we can find it by regress-
ing ln(y(-t) on the years of education of the household reference person and
sex dummies. For each household observation In (yit), we therefore obtain
two new observations, the predicted (by education and sex) value, ln(yf)
and the residual, ln(yft). To understand their interpretation, consider, for
12. We decompose the logarithm of earnings because the standard deviation of the log of a
variable has a cardinal interpretation, which makes our findings below easier to evaluate.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 95
example, household i with lny!f = -0.4, In (yft) = -0.2 and h\(yft) = -0.2; thus,
this household has earnings 40% below the average earnings of a house-
hold with the same age and same race; half of this difference is explained
by its education/sex characteristic and the other half is purely idiosyn-
cratic variation.
From {ln(y,^)}, we compute cross-sectional between-group variances G
2t,
and from {ln(yf)}, we compute cross-sectional idiosyncratic variances
G
2dt. This procedure yields time series {G
2t/G
2dt}teT of variances satisfying:
Guf = (1)
for our sample period T.
Figure 5 shows the trends in between- and within-group earnings stan-
dard deviations. Note that within-group inequality accounts for a larger
fraction of total inequality but that both the between- and the within-
group component display a significant increase. Within-group inequality
increases throughout the sample, while between-group inequality













~r— i i !
i i i i
1970 1975 1980 1985
Year
1990 199596 • KRUEGER & PERRI
declines slightly in the 1970s (reflecting a reduction in the college premium)
but increases significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. The patterns of both
inequality measures from the CE are again similar to those from the CPS
and the census data described by Katz and Autor (1999).
3.2 CONSUMPTION AND HOURS INEQUALITY
Our focus on welfare now leads us to investigate the evolution of the vari-
ables more directly connected to the lifetime utility of households,
namely, consumption and leisure.
3.2.1 Consumption Inequality Figure 6 displays the trend in disposable
earnings inequality (from Figure 5), together with two measures of con-
sumption inequality. Both measures are standard deviations of house-
hold per adult equivalent nondurable consumption plus imputed
services from durables. (This is the definition of consumption used
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throughout the paper; see the data appendix and our earlier work
[Krueger and Perri, 2002] for details about the construction of the con-
sumption data.) The first measure, labeled consumption (Positive Wage
Sample), is computed using the same sample selection criterion we use
for wage and earnings inequality and does not include households with
reference persons that do not work. The second measure, labeled con-
sumption (Full Sample), includes all households that are complete
income respondents, have a reference person between the ages of 20 and
64, and report positive consumption. Notice that the second sample is
larger than the first (about 15% larger) and that it includes households
whose reference person has left the labor force or is suffering a long
unemployment spell. The picture shows that, although the level of
inequality differs across the two samples, neither series of consumption
inequality displays an increase comparable to the one registered for dis-
posable earnings inequality. In Figure 7, we plot the average per-adult
equivalent consumption of the household in the bottom, middle, and
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top quintile of the disposable earnings distribution (relative to average
consumption in that year).
1
3
Both figures confirm and extend our earlier findings (Krueger and Perri,
2002). During a period of strongly widening wage and earnings disper-
sion, there has been surprisingly little increase in consumption inequality.
1
4
In particular, households at the bottom of the earnings distribution have
experienced only a mild reduction in their relative consumption, even
though their relative earnings have declined substantially.
Note that, even though total consumption inequality has increased by
only a small amount, this phenomenon is a result of two offsetting trends.
We decompose—as we did for earnings—consumption inequality into
within- and between-group inequality.
1
5 Figure 8 shows that the between-
group component has increased substantially, by about the same magni-
tude as the increase in between-group earnings inequality. In stark
contrast to earnings, within-group consumption inequality has, in fact,
slightly declined. We draw two lessons from this decomposition, which
will be crucial for interpreting our welfare calculations below. First, it is
not true, as one may think from simply looking at overall consumption
inequality, that the increase in earnings inequality had no impact on con-
sumption inequality. Rather, it suggests that the increase in between-
group earnings inequality (i.e., the increase in the skill premium)
translates almost one to one into an increase of consumption inequality.
Because between-group inequality tends to be highly persistent, it is
likely to have important welfare consequences.
1
6 Second, the fact that
13. Consumption by earnings quintile is computed using the sample of all households that
report positive consumption (full sample). If we restrict the sample to households with
a reference person working at least one week, consumption by quintiles displays the
same constant pattern.
14. We document that this fact is robust compared to various definition of consumption expen-
ditures (Krueger and Perri, 2002). It is worth mentioning that our results are based on quar-
terly consumption expenditures reported in the CE interview survey. Attanasio (2002)
presents some results from the CE diary survey (that is, the biweekly survey of expenditure
data for items purchased on a daily or weekly basis) showing increasing consumption
inequality. Additional work should be done to establish the exact source of the discrepancy
between the two surveys. Another important concern with the CE consumption data is that
their total does not match the National Income and Product Accounting total. Slesnick
(2001) discusses some possible explanations for this phenomenon but concludes that a large
part of the discrepancy between CE and NIPA is still unexplained.
15. We do the decomposition exactly as for income. We first control for changes in the
age/race structure of the population by regressing the log of nondurable consumption
plus services from durables on a quartic polynomial in the age of the reference person
and on a dummy for his or her race. We then regress the residuals on the years of edu-
cation and gender of the reference person of the household. The sample used consists of
all households that report positive consumption.
16. This is a point that has been highlighted by Attanasio and Davis (1996). In the second
part, we will provide an estimate of the persistence of between-group differences.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 99
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within-group disposable earnings inequality has increased while within-
group consumption inequality has not indicates that the increase in
within-group earnings variations has been effectively smoothed by
households, possibly through some form of credit markets.
1
7
3.2.2 Hours Inequality A household's lifetime utility depends on both the
consumption and leisure it enjoys, so the number of hours worked by
members of the household, by determining the hours available for leisure,
is an important determinant of welfare. Therefore, in this section we pre-
sent some evidence on how the distribution of hours worked across
American households has changed. In Figure 9 we plot the percentage
standard deviation of household yearly hours worked (per adult),
17. Blundell and Preston (1998), Heathcote et al. (2003), and we [Krueger and Perri, 2002]
investigate the role of credit markets in generating this divergence between income and
consumption inequality in detail.100 • KRUEGER & PERRI
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We observe that, despite the increase in wage dispersion, the variability
in hours worked shows a moderate decline. If hours and consumption
were uncorrelated, abstracting from any change in their trends, the reduc-
tion in hours dispersion would imply welfare gains. However, Figure 10
suggests that hours and consumption are correlated. It plots the number
of per-person yearly hours worked for all households in our sample and
for households in different quintiles of the consumption distribution.
Apart from the strong average increase in hours worked, whose causes
and consequences we will not analyze here, the figure reveals two
other facts.
1
9 First, households with high consumption work more hours;
18. We use the same sample we used for the wage and earnings distribution. We construct
per-person hours worked by households in the following way: if a household consists of
a single adult member, its hours worked are the hours worked in a year by that adult,
and if the household consists of (at least) two adult members, average hours worked by
the household are measured as total hours worked by both members divided by 2.
19. Inspection of the CE data immediately reveals that most of the average increase in hours
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second, high-consumption households have increased their hours by less
than low-consumption households. For example, in 1972-1973, house-
holds in the bottom quintile of the consumption distribution worked on
average 28% less than households in the top quintile. In 1999-2000, the
same ratio has fallen to 17%. In other words, Figure 10 suggests a positive,
but falling, correlation between consumption and hours worked.
Figure 11 plots the correlation between hours and consumption (total,
between-group component, and within-group component). The figure
indeed shows a significant decline over time in the correlation between
hours and consumption. This declining positive correlation explains the
fall in hours variability and, together with constant consumption inequal-
ity, can generate negative welfare effects for low-consumption house-
holds, even if their relative consumption may not fall. More concretely, in
the 1970s, the high correlation between consumption and hours implied
that households with low consumption were compensated with high
leisure. In the 1990s, the reduction in this correlation implies that house-
holds with relatively low consumption do not enjoy as much leisure as
Figure 10 YEARLY HOURS WORKED PER PERSON (AVERAGE AND BY
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they used to and thus face potentially substantial welfare losses from this
change over time. We will quantify the welfare consequences from a
declining correlation in consumption and hours worked in the section
containing our welfare calculation below.
3.3 SUMMARY
To summarize Section 3, the CE data suggest that the substantial increase
in wage inequality has caused an increase in household earnings inequal-
ity of similar magnitude. The tax and transfer system has not mitigated
this increase, so that it appears equally strong in disposable earnings. The
consumption distribution data, on the other hand, suggest that low-
consumption households did almost as well (relatively to the mean) in the
late 1990s as they did in the 1970s.
This finding does not necessarily imply that the welfare effects of the
increase in inequality are negligible. A closer investigation of consump-
tion inequality reveals that households that suffer permanent relative
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income falls (e.g., households with little education) experience substantial
declines in relative consumption, with associated important welfare con-
sequences.
In addition, the declining trend in the consumption-hours worked cor-
relation suggests that one way through which low-consumption house-
holds maintain their relative consumption is by working longer hours,
again with implied welfare losses. In the next section of the paper, we will
try to quantify the size and exact distribution of these welfare effects.
4. Welfare Consequences of Increased Inequality
What are the welfare consequences of the trends in wage, income, and
consumption inequality documented in the last section? To answer these
questions explicitly, we now have to take a stand on how households
value consumption and leisure, and we have to model, in a statistical or
theoretical way, how a household's consumption and leisure processes
changed as the variability of wages and earnings changed. The second
step can be carried out in (at least) two different ways. Either one takes a
stand on a particular theoretical model, feeds as input into the model two
different earnings processes estimated from data (one reflecting increased
earnings inequality), computes the corresponding consumption and labor
supply allocations implied by the model, and then uses these allocations
to compute the welfare gain and/or loss distribution from the change in
the earnings (or wage) process.
2
0 Alternatively, one can specify or estimate
a statistical model for consumption and labor supply (or leisure). The
parameters governing these processes are allowed to be time dependent,
so that the processes reflect the changes in the cross-sectional distribution
of consumption and hours worked documented in the last section of the
paper. We adopt the second approach in this paper.
We now discuss our exact estimation strategy, then we explain how we
use our estimation results to answer the welfare question posed at the
beginning of the paper, and finally we present our results.
4.1 MODELING HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS, CONSUMPTION,
AND LEISURE PROCESSES
To carry our welfare analysis, we need stochastic processes for disposable
earnings, consumption, and leisure. Take an arbitrary variable of interest
from the last section, for concreteness, disposable earnings. In the empir-
ical analysis, we discussed how each pre-filtered cross section ln(yrt) can
20. Our earlier study (Krueger and Perri, 2002) and the study by Heathcote et al. (2003) take
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be decomposed in a between-group [ln(yf)] and a within-group part
[ln(yg)].
In this section, we specify time-series processes for both components of
earnings. In particular, we assume that both ln(y^) and ln(yf) follow finite
state Markov chains (of cardinality N) with possibly time-varying states




The states {Yf}teT are determined by setting Yt
s(i) equal to the midpoint
of the z'-th quantile of the {ln(yf)} sample for that period. By construction,
our stochastic process matches, for every t, N(N - l)/2 quantile ratios of
{ln(yf)}, its mean (by construction, equal to 0), but not necessarily its
variance.
2
2 A similar construction yields the states {Yf}t eT. Note that,
because of the initial pre-filtering, there is no aggregate growth in the
logs of any of our variables [i.e., E,(ln xit) - 0, for every x and every t],
which in particular removes aggregate consumption growth and growth
in average hours worked. The welfare conclusions presented below
have to be interpreted with this remark in mind, which we will address
in the conclusion.
Finally, we use the panel dimension of the CE to estimate Markov
transition matrices for the variables of interest, which will embody the
persistence properties of our stochastic processes. For all observations
{ln(y|)}/( we group households into N relative classes delimited by
N - 1 uniformly spaced, time dependent quantiles: the first class is
comprised of the bottom 1/N% of the distribution in that quarter for
that variable, the second class is comprised of the following 1/N%, etc.
With this construction, the lowest class for {In yft) is interpreted as the
group of households for which earnings explained by observables (gen-
der and education) is lowest (i.e., households with female head and low
education levels). We then search for all households for which we have
observations in two consecutive periods and compute which relative
class they belong to in the second period.
2
3 After repeating this proce-
21. In principle, our procedure could be used to estimate time-varying transition matrices.
We have experimented with this for the time period 1984-2000 and found that the tran-
sition matrices display very little time variation. We therefore decided to use time-
independent transition matrices in our analysis.
22. We find, however, that the ratio between the variance implied by the estimated process
and the variance in the data is quite high (about 70%) and almost constant over time. It
would have been easy to set the states of our stochastic process to match exactly the vari-
ance in the data, but we opted to match quantile ratios of the data because of our inter-
est in the distribution of welfare losses. Our procedure is similar in spirit to the one used
by Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
23. More precisely, a period is roughly three quarters because we use data from the second
and fifth interview of a household in the CE to determine transitions. This timing comes
closest to our notion of a period length of one year. Second, the only useful income obser-
vations for a household are contained in these interviews.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 105
Table 1 THE PERSISTENCE OF THE ESTIMATED PROCESSES
1
Within-group Between-group
Disposable earnings 0.76 0.97
Consumption 0.72 0.98




dure for every period in the sample, the probability 7i| of transiting
from class i to class j is computed as the total number of households
transiting from i to /, divided by the total number of households start-
ing in class i for the entire sample.
2
4 Using the same procedure for the
sample {ln(i/^)} yields a transition matrix n
d. As a result of our estima-
tion procedure, we obtain Markov processes for the group-specific as
well as within-group components of earnings; we follow exactly the
same procedures to construct time-series processes for household con-
sumption. In Table 1 we report a summary measure of the persistence
properties of the various processes we estimate. Note that the
processes for between-group differences are significantly more persist-
ent than the processes for within-group differences, so that changes in
between-group inequality are more likely to have larger welfare
effects.
For hours worked, we find that between-group inequality explains
only a very small fraction of total variance (less than 0.5%), so the process
for hours does not distinguish between the two components. In our wel-
fare analysis, we will also study the case in which welfare is jointly deter-
mined by household consumption and hours worked. For this case, we
specify a joint stochastic process for between-group consumption,
within-group consumption, and hours worked. Because the correlation
between hours and between-group consumption is fairly constant and
close to 0 (see Figure 11), we assume that hours and between-group con-
sumption are uncorrelated. However, we specify the parameters of the
joint Markov chain for hours and within-group consumption so that
the correlation between the two variables in the model matches exactly
24. Transitions of households between groups are rare and occur only if there are large
swings in the returns to education, in the wage gender gap, or (the dominating reason)
if households change the gender or the education of their reference person (through
death, marriage, or divorce).106 • KRUEGER & PERRI
the falling cross-sectional correlation between the two variables in the
data, as reported in Figure II.
2
5
In short, denote the estimated stochastic processes for earnings, con-
sumption, and hours by (Y, C, H, respectively) and the processes associ-
ated with no change in wage inequality (i.e., the process with states
constant at their 1972 values) by (Y, L, H, respectively). These are the nec-
essary ingredients for the welfare calculations, which we describe next.
4.2 CALCULATING THE WELFARE CONSEQUENCES
We assume that households value streams of consumption ct and leisure
lt = l-ht (where ht are hours worked per household member, as a fraction
of total nonsleep time) according to the lifetime utility function:
t = o
We restrict the period utility function u to lie in the parametric class:
a/l-ail-o {
r a/l
L * for a # 1
1 - a
ocln(c) + (1 - a)ln(Z) for a - 1
where a, 3 and o are preference parameters that govern the relative
importance of consumption relative to leisure, time discounting, and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, respectively.
2
6 Nested in this for-
mulation are utility functions that depend on consumption alone (a = 1).
Suppose that all economic variables follow Markov processes as esti-
mated above, then we can write:
V{t, c,l) = u (c, /) + PE [V(t + 1, c', /') I (c, /)] (2)
Note that, conditional on knowing the function V, the conditional expec-
tation can be evaluated because the stochastic processes for consumption
and leisure have a Markov structure.
2
7 Also note that, for an arbitrary
25. The complete results of our estimation procedure are available on request from the
authors.
26. Note that these utility functions have unit elasticity between consumption and leisure.
With this class of utility functions, our welfare results are invariant to long-run deter-
ministic average consumption growth.
27. This formulation implicitly assumes that households are infinitely lived. With finite lives,
age becomes an additional state variable. The welfare consequences for a person living
through the increase in inequality for only a finite number of periods is roughly propor-
tional to the numbers reported below (such a household faces the same stochastic
processes as our model households, simply for fewer periods). The proportionality fac-
tor is less than one and decreases with the remaining lifetime of a household.Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 107
individual with current consumption and leisure (c, I), expected lifetime
utility is given by V(t, c, I), which obviously depends on the time-varying
stochastic process for consumption and leisure. Also note that this
Bellman equation does not involve any maximization.
In particular, let V(c, I) be the value function associated with the
estimated stochastic processes, and let V(c, I) denote the value function
associated with the stochastic processes if wage inequality had not





8 More precisely, V is computed by employing the same transi-
tion matrices as for V, but under the assumption that the states of the
Markov chains remain at their estimated 1972 values forever rather than
change over time, in the way estimated above.
The welfare consequences of an agent with current state (c, /) in
1972 (the distribution of which we observe in our cross-sectional
dataset) of the ensuing increase in wage inequality in the future is thus
given by
W(c,T) = \V(c,T)-V{c,t)\
where | • || is a particular metric. We let W(c, I) equal the uniform percent-
age increase of consumption in each state of the world needed to make a
household indifferent between the stochastic processes with more vari-
ability and the ones without, keeping leisure constant. What we want to
document is the distribution of W(c, I), that is, the distribution of the wel-
fare consequences of the increase in wage inequality.
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.2 An Upper Bound Suppose that households do not have access to any
savings technology and do not value leisure.
2
9 Then consumption equals
labor earnings y and, if we ignore irrelevant constants and suppress time






28. We suppress the time index t = 1972.
29. The same results are obtained if households do not change their labor supply or if con-
sumption and leisure are separable in the utility function.108 • KRUEGER & PERRI
and a similar definition for V"(y
g ,y













d) gives the percentage increase in consumption (or
earnings) at the new, more unequal earnings process, at each contingency,




indifferent between the old and the new wage (and thus earnings)
process.
3
0 To compute this number, three steps have to be carried out:
1. Solve for the functions V and V using standard value function iteration,
given time-series processes Y and Y.
2. Draw arbitrary y = (y
g, y




Evidently steps 2 and 3 can be carried out easily for all y in the initial dis-
tribution of earnings, and thus the distribution of welfare consequences
can be derived. These numbers provide an upper bound for the welfare
consequences from increased earnings inequality because agents are
assumed to be unable to smooth consumption via savings responses.
A simple example illustrates this basic procedure. Suppose that before
1972, earnings followed the simple continuous-state white-noise process:
In (y') = £ + £
where £ ~ N(0, 6
2e). After 1972, the process changes to:
In (y') = £ + £
with £ ~ N(0, Og), a
2E = 1&1, with Y > 1 and:
Note that the adjustment of the mean of log earnings is required for the
level of earnings to have the same mean before and after the change in its
variance. For period utility being logarithmic, the value function V solves:
30. For o = 1, one can show that the welfare criterion, as defined above, is given by:
y
d) = exp [(1 - (3) (V(y
g, y
d) - V(y
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where O is the normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) with vari-
ance Og = Yc*e. The function V solves the same equation, with O replaced by
Y, the normal cdf with variance G
2E. A simple guess-and-verify strategy
shows that:
In particular, if v = 0 (which simply normalizes mean earnings), then:
W(y) =W=exp(b(|l-|i))-l
= exp(|jexp(di(Y-l))-l>0
For this particular example, the welfare losses from increased earnings
inequality are (1) independent of an agents' current earnings and (2) pro-
portional to the increase of the variance of log earnings Gl(y-1).
For a general stochastic earnings process and period utility function, of
course, the value function cannot be solved by guess-and-verify methods
and has to be computed numerically.
3
1 As a benchmark, an annual time
discount rate of 4% and logarithmic utility are assumed. We then docu-
ment how our welfare conclusions depend on the degree of risk aversion
of households and discuss the role of the time discount rate for our results.
In Figure 12a, we plot the welfare losses implied by our estimated




d), where both Y% and Y
d have cardinality 9. Thus, there are
81 distinct earnings classes, with equal population mass
 lA\. On the x axis
we plot idiosyncratic earnings y
d as a fraction of average (idiosyncratic)
earnings, and each of the separate 9 lines corresponds to one group-
specific earnings level y
8. The y axis shows the welfare losses, in percent-
age consumption equivalent variation, implied by the increase in earnings
inequality, as estimated by our processes.
We observe that the welfare losses implied by the increase in earnings
inequality are potentially substantial, amounting to as much as 2% or
more of consumption for more than half of the population, namely, the
earnings-poor households in 1972. The welfare losses are declining (and
substantially so) as one moves up the group-specific earnings distribution,
to the extent that the highest two earnings groups (22% of the population)
31. Given the discrete nature of the income process, this computation can be done quickly
and with precision using a standard value function iteration algorithm.110 • KRUEGER & PERRI
Figure 12 WELFARE LOSSES
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benefit from the increase in earnings inequality.
3
2 Welfare losses (or gains)
are fairly uniform in the idiosyncratic income state, y
d, that a household
starts with in 1972.
These findings can be interpreted as follows. The aggregate statistics
show an increase in inequality in the last 30 years. An individual house-
hold in 1972 experiences two events: future changes in its expected mean
earnings and more earnings risk in the future. Conditional on remaining
in the same earnings class, high-earnings class households will enjoy
increasing relative earnings, and low-earning classes will experience
declining relative earnings. These outcomes are true for both the group
component as well as the idiosyncratic component of earnings. From the
figure, we observe, however, that the welfare losses differ substantially by
32. Note that, when we refer to welfare losses from inequality from now on, it is understood
that individuals are affected directly only by changes in their relative earnings (and
higher earnings uncertainty in the future), rather than by the change in the aggregate sta-
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groups but are fairly uniform with respect to the idiosyncratic earnings
component. This difference is explained by the much higher persistence
of the between-group earnings process compared to the idiosyncratic
process documented in the last section. As a rough approximation, sup-
pose that the group-earnings transition matrix is the identity matrix (so
that all agents with probability of 1 stay in their earnings group) and the
idiosyncratic earnings process is iid over time. Then welfare losses should
vary greatly by group (because relative group earnings have diverged
over time) but should be uniform across idiosyncratic states because
everybody is equally negatively affected by the higher idiosyncratic earn-
ings uncertainty. Figure 12 indicates that this first approximation provides
fairly accurate intuition for the computed welfare numbers. The negative
(uniform) impact of higher idiosyncratic uncertainty also explains why
almost the entire population suffers welfare losses from increased earn-
ings inequality, even though half the population experiences increases in
relative earnings.
From the previous discussion, one would expect the welfare losses from
increasing earnings inequality to rise with risk aversion of the household
because higher idiosyncratic uncertainty is disliked more severely. That
this is indeed the case is demonstrated by Figure 12b, which assumes a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of a = 2. Now the welfare losses become
as high as 8% of consumption, and despite significant expected earnings
increases, even the highest earnings group suffers welfare losses of about
2% due to the increase in future earnings (and thus, by construction, con-
sumption) variability. To summarize, when judged from earnings data for
a degree of risk aversion of a = 2, commonly assumed in the macro and
public finance literature, all groups of the population suffer welfare losses
from increased earnings instability that more than outweigh the increase
in relative incomes experienced by the highest earnings groups.
Before documenting how our results change if one uses consumption
rather than earnings data for our welfare analysis, a brief discussion of the
role of the time discount factor is in order. Our estimated transition matri-
ces (in particular for the group component) are persistent, but not per-
fectly persistent, so that the unconditional probability of a household
leaving its 1972 earnings state increases with time. With sizable time dis-
counting of 4% per year, the welfare losses are affected by events along
the transition period 1972-2000 (the increase in earnings inequality occurs
gradually over this time period) and vary crucially with initial earnings
states because earnings realizations in the early years of the transition
largely determine welfare, as seen in Figure 12. If one were to choose very
low time discounting (none in the limit), then households' welfare losses
are determined largely (completely in the limit) by the change in the112 • KRUEGER & PERRI
steady-state earnings distribution and would depend on neither a house-
hold's initial earnings position nor the transition path.
3
3 Since we want to
document the distribution of welfare losses across different population
groups, we chose a time discount rate of 4% that attributes substantial
importance to initial conditions and transition paths. As a comparison, a
time discount rate of 0.05% yields welfare losses, roughly uniform across
the population, of about 1.4% for a = 1 and 10.5% for c = 2.
4.3.2 The Effects of Consumption Smoothing The previous section docu-
mented potentially large welfare costs of increased earnings inequality,
under the assumption that households have no ability to smooth con-
sumption intertemporally via self-insurance and/or formal and informal
insurance arrangements. Calculations like these often form the explicit or
implicit basis for concern expressed about the increase in inequality by
researchers and policymakers.
As argued in the introduction, basing welfare evaluations of increased
inequality on consumption data directly takes the mitigating effects of
intertemporal smoothing opportunities, government transfer programs,
and explicit or implicit insurance programs (such as transfers among
members of the extended family) into account. Therefore, in this subsec-
tion, we repeat our previous analysis but now use estimated consumption
processes from the CE instead of earnings processes. The Bellman equa-
tion becomes:
V(c) = u(c) + $E[V(c')\(c)] (3)
which is solved as easily as in the previous subsection, under the main-
tained assumption that the estimated stochastic consumption processes
have a Markov structure.
Again we start with the benchmark case of logarithmic utility and plot
the welfare losses from increased consumption inequality in Figure 12c.
Qualitatively, the welfare consequences are similar to the previous sec-
tion: the consumption group to which a household belongs largely deter-
mines whether it ends up a loser or a winner of the increase in inequality.
Again, the welfare consequences are fairly uniform across idiosyncratic
consumption states. Quantitatively, however, some crucial differences in
the results based on earnings observations emerge. The highest welfare
losses now amount to slightly more than 5% of consumption, but only for
33. One may interpret this latter thought experiment and the welfare numbers as a house-
hold living behind the veil of ignorance: they don't know which income state they will
be born into in the old, pre-1972 steady state and they don't know in which income state
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the consumption-poorest 10% of the population.
3
4 Note that, while maxi-
mal welfare losses from increased inequality when measured with con-
sumption data are even higher than with earnings, a much larger fraction
of the population (roughly 45%) now benefits sufficiently from the
increase in relative group consumption to experience welfare gains from
increased consumption inequality. This differential finding is due to the
fact that the variability of the idiosyncratic component of consumption has
remained relatively constant over time, very much in contrast to that of
earnings. Therefore, the welfare consequences, when derived from con-




For earnings, an increase in the risk aversion of households led to dra-
matically increased welfare losses from increased inequality, but when
using consumption data, the welfare consequences of increased inequality
are close to invariant to changes in a household's attitudes toward risk.
Again, this finding is explained by the stable trend of the variance of the
idiosyncratic consumption component. The welfare losses and gains in
Figure 12d, computed for risk aversion of a = 2, are almost indistinguish-
able from the corresponding figure 12c for o = 1. Thus, in comparison to
our findings for earnings, for a reasonable degree of risk aversion of a = 2,
consumption data do not suggest nearly as severe welfare losses as do
earnings data. Repeating our calculations with a low time discount rate of
0.05% again results in welfare losses that are fairly uniform across the pop-
ulation, amounting to losses of 0.5% for o = 1 and 1.6% for o = 2, again sig-
nificantly smaller than the corresponding numbers derived from earnings.
Our findings are consistent with Attanasio and Davis (1996), who doc-
ument that a significant share of the increase in wage inequality between
observably different groups is reflected in increases in consumption
inequality between these groups. Our welfare numbers reproduce exactly
this phenomenon. These results are also in line with findings in our ear-
lier work (Krueger and Perri, 2002) because the idiosyncratic component
of consumption inequality has not increased significantly over time and
thus has not, to any noticeable extent, contributed to the welfare losses
from increased inequality. Finally note that, to focus on the welfare effects
of increased inequality, we have effectively detrended our data from
34. These high losses of the lowest consumption group compared to the more moderate
losses of the lowest earnings group documented above are largely due to the timing of the
transition, coupled with sizable time discounting: relative consumption for the lowest
group drops early on and then stays constant, whereas relative earnings for the lowest
group declines most dramatically only at the end of the 1972-2000 transition period.
35. Since the transition matrix for the group component of consumption displays very high
persistence, increased risk in the between-group component is quantitatively of second-
order importance.114 • KRUEGER & PERRI
aggregate consumption growth. Thus, our results are not to be interpreted
as absolute standards of living having declined over the last 30 years for
a large fraction of the population.
4.3.3 The Impact of Changes in Leisure In our empirical section we docu-
mented that, in light of increased wage variability, the relative labor sup-
ply of different groups in the population has changed, albeit only
moderately so. In this section we extend our welfare analysis to incorpo-
rate these changes in relative labor supply and hence leisure. The Bellman
equation for this augmented problem now becomes:
V{c,t) = u(c,T) + &E[V{c',l')/{c,T)] (4)
Here, the expectations operator pertains to the joint Markov process for
consumption c and leisure /. This Markov process may feature independ-
ence between c and / (our benchmark) or allow for dependence between
consumption and leisure (a case that we will investigate as a sensitivity
analysis).
Both the definition of welfare costs as well as their computation remain
the same as in the previous subsection. We parametrize the period utility
function as before, and choose a share parameter a = % and a nonsleep
time endowment of 15 hours per person, per day.
3
6
4.3.3.1 LABOR SUPPLY UNCORRELATED WITH CONSUMPTION How does the
inclusion of leisure into the analysis change the magnitude of the wel-
fare losses from increased inequality? To a first-order approximation,
the magnitude as well as the distribution of these losses is unaffected by
the incorporation of leisure into the analysis. Again, the consumption
group a household belongs to in 1972 largely determines how it fares in
terms of welfare, whereas the idiosyncratic consumption state, the




36. In a static deterministic model with our preferences, an agent would choose to work
exactly one-third of her nonsleep time if a =
 lA, independent of the wage. Note that the
coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption is now given by:
= act + 1 - a
When we report results for a particular risk aversion, we set c, given a = Vi, to the appro-
priate value to attain that risk aversion.
37. The reason that the leisure state is not an important determinant of the welfare losses is
similar to the one for idiosyncratic consumption: we estimate labor supply, and hence
leisure, to be not nearly as persistent as group consumption (roughly as persistent as
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Because the hours and thus leisure distribution has become somewhat
less dispersed between 1972 and 2000, the welfare losses from increased
overall inequality are slightly mitigated by the presence of leisure in the
utility function, but the reduction in welfare losses amounts to no more
than 0.4% for any of the population groups, compared to the welfare losses
reported in the last section based on consumption observations alone.
One has to bear in mind, though, that our estimation of stochastic
processes for hours worked, as with consumption, effectively removed
the positive trend in average hours worked by households. Therefore, our
welfare numbers do not reflect the potentially adverse effect on well-
being of longer hours worked by a large fraction of U.S. households.
4.3.3.2 LABOR SUPPLY CORRELATED WITH CONSUMPTION In our empirical analy-
sis, we found that the correlation between idiosyncratic consumption and
leisure is negative and, more important, has declined in absolute value
between 1972 and 2000. In other words, while low-consumption housseholds
used to enjoy at least significantly higher leisure in 1972, this situation has
become less pronounced in 2000. We now investigate whether allowing con-
sumption and leisure to be correlated (and therefore allowing more extreme
negative states over time—those with increasingly low relative consumption
and decreasingly high leisure) modifies our result that the incorporation of
leisure into the analysis leaves our welfare numbers roughly unaffected.
Figure 13 compares the welfare losses (or gains) implied by three util-
ity and stochastic process specifications: consumption only (a subset of
Figures 12c and 12d), consumption and leisure when uncorrelated (see
the discussion in the previous subsection), and consumption and leisure
processes that are correlated. The subpanels distinguish risk aversion and
agents belonging to different consumption groups. All four panels con-
tain the welfare losses of agents that start with the highest leisure state in
1972. Similar (but somewhat less pronounced) results are obtained for
households starting in other leisure states in 1972.
For separable preferences (CRRA = 1), correlation between consump-
tion and leisure does not change our findings from the previous section.
As households become more averse to risk, however, welfare losses aris-
ing under the correlated consumption-leisure process actually exceed the
corresponding number under the consumption-only process, by up to 0.5
percentage points (see Figure 13b). This finding is due to the higher like-
lihood of experiencing states with low consumption and fairly low leisure,
compared to the situation in which consumption and leisure were mod-
eled as independent processes. We conclude that, while the welfare num-
bers based on consumption alone tell most of the story, the incorporation
of leisure may, when correlated with consumption, increase welfare losses
from increased inequality to a quantitatively notrivial extent.116 • KRUEGER & PERRI
5. Conclusion
What are the welfare consequences of the increase in inequality in the
United States between 1972 and 2000? In this paper we use a standard
intertemporal utility function and wage, earnings, consumption, and
hours-worked data from the Consumer Expenditure survey to answer
this question.
Our main findings are twofold. First, welfare losses can be substantial,
with significant variation of these losses across the population. Whereas
households at the bottom of the consumption distribution suffer declines
in welfare up to about 6% in consumption equivalent variation, house-
holds at the top end of the distribution enjoy sizable welfare gains of sim-
ilar magnitude as the losses of the poorest agents. Overall, a majority of
the population (based on consumption observations, roughly 60% of
Americans) is on the losing side. The main part of these losses arises from
the increase in between-group consumption inequality. The increase in
the consumption/leisure correlation contributes to moderately higher
Figure 13 WELFARE LOSSES
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welfare losses, an order of magnitude of 0.5% for most households.
Second, while welfare losses from increased inequality are fairly sizable
for a lot of U.S. households when based on consumption data, they are
not nearly as big and affect not nearly as many households as an analysis
based on earnings data alone would suggest (80% to 100% of the popula-
tion losing up to 10%). In addition, the estimates of welfare losses based
on consumption and leisure processes are fairly robust to different values
of risk aversion, while those based on income processes are highly sensi-
tive to that parameter.
To focus more precisely on the welfare effects of increasing inequality,
we have ignored two important features of our data. First, there was sub-
stantial growth in average real household consumption; second, total
hours worked by a typical household increased noticeably over the last
30 years. To the extent that these trends are causally linked to the trend
in inequality, we have overstated (because of consumption growth) or
understand (because of the decline in leisure) the welfare implications of
the increase in inequality. Future empirical and theoretical work is needed
to understand if, and to what extent, the trends in hours worked, in aver-
age consumption, and in the cross-sectional variance of consumption are
causally related.
6. Data Appendix
Our statistics are based on repeated cross sections constructed from the
interview surveys of the Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey for the years
1972-1973,1980-1981, and 1984-2000, as provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The 1972-1973 samples were conducted quarterly, but only
annual totals were released; thus, for these years, we have only two cross
sections, each reporting consumption and income for the year of the
interview. The surveys from 1980 onward were conducted on a quarterly
basis, so we have four cross sections for each year. Households report con-
sumption expenditures for the quarter preceding the interview and
income data for the year preceding the interview. A fraction of the house-
holds in the survey is interviewed for four consecutive quarters and
reports consumption information in every quarter, as well as income and
wage information in the first and last interview. For these households we
can construct annual measures of wages, earnings, consumption, and
number of hours from 1972-1973 until 2000.
6.1 WAGES, EARNINGS, AND HOURS
The definition of wages we use is the earnings of the reference person
divided by the number of weeks worked by the person during the year.118 • KRUEGER & PERRI
We construct earnings of the reference person as her wages and salaries
plus a fixed fraction of her self-employment farm and nonfarm income
(the exact fraction is 0.864 and is taken from Diaz-Jimenez, Quadrini, and
Rios-Rull [1997]). Household earnings simply sums the earnings of the
reference person and her spouse. Disposable household earnings are com-
puted as household earnings minus reported federal, state, and local taxes
(net of refunds) and social security contributions paid by the household.
We then add reported government transfers: in particular we add unem-
ployment insurance, food stamps, and welfare receipts. Because the
1972-1973 CE does not report the number of hours worked per week by
household members, only whether they are part- or full-time workers,
hours worked by a person are computed as the number of weeks worked
by that person times 20 if the person works part-time, or times 40 if the
person works full-time. For the post-1980 sample, we compare the stan-
dard deviation of hours constructed in this way with the series con-
structed using actual weekly hours; the two series have very similar
trends (although different levels).
6.2 CONSUMPTION
Our definition of consumption consists of nondurables plus imputed
services from durables. It includes expenditures on nondurable goods
and services, expenditures on household furnishings, and imputed serv-
ices from houses and cars. Expenditures on nondurable goods and serv-
ices include consumption expenditures for food, alcoholic beverages,
tobacco, utilities, personal care, household operations, public transporta-
tion, gasoline and motor oil, apparel, education, reading, health services,
and miscellaneous expenditures. Each component of consumption is
deflated by its corresponding monthly consumer price index (CPI) from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Expenditures on household furnishings include items such as furniture,
appliances, and floor coverings (e.g., rugs). The reason that we use expen-
ditures and not imputed services is that no information is available in the
CE for the value or the inventory of the stock of these furnishings, and the
panel dimension of the CE is too short to carry out perpetual inventory
techniques. With respect to vehicles, we impute services from cars in the
following manner, following closely the procedure outlined by Cutler and
Katz (1991b). From the CE data, we have expenditures for purchases of
new and used vehicles. We also have data on the number of cars that a
consumer unit possesses. For each year we first select all households that
report positive expenditures for vehicle purchases and then run a regres-
sion of vehicle expenditures on a constant; age, sex, and education of the
reference person of the consumer unit; total consumption expenditures,Welfare Consequences of the Increase in Inequality in the U.S. • 119
excluding vehicle expenditures of the consumer; the same variable
squared; total income before taxes; family size; and quarter dummies. We
use the estimated regression coefficients to predict expenditures for vehi-
cles for all households in that quarter (i.e., for those who did and for those
who did not report positive vehicle expenditures). Our measure of con-
sumption services from vehicles is then the predicted expenditure on
vehicles times the number of vehicles the consumer unit owns, times
 lAi
(reflecting the assumption of average complete depreciation of a vehicle
after 32 quarters), plus other expenditures for cars, such as insurance,
maintenance, and finance charges. With respect to housing services, the
CE provides information on rent paid for the residence of the consumer
unit, including insurance and other out-of-pocket expenses paid by the
renter. To impute housing services for those consumer households that
own their residence, we use a variable from the CE that measures the mar-
ket rent (as estimated by the reference person of the consumer unit) that
the residence would command if rented out.
3
8 This variable is not avail-
able for the years 1980-1981 and 1993-1994; for these years we do not
compute inequality measures for nondurables ND+ consumption expen-
ditures.
3
9 As with nondurable consumption, all imputed services from
consumer durables and housing are deflated with the corresponding CPI.
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Comment
STEVEN J. DAVIS
University of Chicago and NBER
Krueger and Perri set their sights on a major question: What are the welfare
consequences of the pronounced rise in U.S. wage and income inequality in
recent decades? Assumptions about the answer play an important role in
many policy discussions and underlie much of the interest in wage and
income inequality. I applaud the authors for tackling the question in a way
that makes assumptions explicit and that facilitates constructive criticism.
The authors also deserve much credit for grappling with the data on con-
sumption inequality, a challenging task. As it turns out, however, I think
that a compelling answer to the question awaits further research.
The authors describe trend changes in the distribution of household
consumption expenditures using data from the Interview Survey compo-
nent of the Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey. They find rising con-
sumption inequality between groups defined by sex and educational
attainment of the household head, but declining consumption inequality
within groups. Overall consumption inequality changes little during the
past three decades by their account—in striking contrast to a sharp rise in
the inequality of wages, earnings, and disposable incomes.
They proceed to calculate welfare effects associated with certain
changes in the consumption distribution. To do so, they specify and esti-
mate stochastic processes for group-level and idiosyncratic components
of consumption, and they postulate standard preferences over consump-
tion paths.
1 They then compute, as of 1972, consumption-equivalent
Orazio Attanasio, David Autor, Erik Hurst, and Daniel Slesnick kindly supplied data for this
comment and my remarks at the Macro-economics Annual Conference. Daniel Slesnick pro-
vided several useful observations about the Consumer Expenditure survey, and Erik Hurst
provided valuable information about the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals.
Thanks also to Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri for many helpful communications about
their work.
1. Krueger and Perri also characterize the evolution of the hours-worked distribution, and
some of their welfare calculations consider preferences defined over consumption and
leisure. Their chief results involve consumption, however, and I limit my remarks to con-
sumption-related issues.122 • DAVIS
welfare differences between estimated and counterfactual processes for
consumption. They report these welfare differences as a function of edu-
cation and initial position in the consumption distribution.
My remarks below develop two main themes. First, there are good rea-
sons to doubt the basic characterization of consumption inequality trends
offered by Krueger and Perri. Second, in their welfare analysis, they do
not adequately model the uncertainty faced by households, which limits
the usefulness of their welfare results.
1. Evaluating the Evidence on Trends in Consumption
Inequality
Figure 6 in Krueger and Perri shows a striking divergence between the
path of disposable earnings inequality and the path of consumption
inequality. Figure 8 shows declining within-group consumption inequal-
ity in recent decades and, in particular, since 1987.
2 This decline is at odds
with the strong rise in the within-group inequality of disposable earnings,
as depicted in Figure 5.
To evaluate these empirical results, I proceed as follows. First, I con-
sider whether they fit comfortably with other evidence on consumption
responses to income shocks and conclude that they do not. Second, I note
concerns about the quality of the Interview Survey component of the CE
and the possibility that it yields an inaccurate picture of consumption
inequality trends.
3 Third, I look to other sources of data on consumption
inequality trends and find, in contrast to the CE Interview Survey, that
they point to rising consumption inequality.
2. As a preliminary step, Krueger and Perri run cross-sectional regressions of consumption
per adult-equivalent on a quartic polynomial in the household head's age and an indica-
tor variable for his or her race. The consumption residuals from these regressions then
serve as inputs to the remaining analysis. By allowing the coefficients on the age and race
variables to vary freely by year in these regressions, Krueger and Perri sweep away poten-
tially important changes in the consumption distribution. By constraining the age poly-
nomial to have the same shape across education groups in each cross section, Krueger and
Perri may obtain misleading characterizations of within-group inequality trends. For
example, if the household distribution becomes more concentrated in education cate-
gories with similar age profiles, then the residual distribution tends to become less dis-
persed, even if there is no change in the distribution of consumption conditional on age
and education. I ignore these issues in the main text.
3. Estimates of inequality in wages, earnings, and income are also subject to measurement
problems, but the basic facts about U.S. trends in this regard are well established. Unlike
the situation for consumption data, there are multiple, independent sources of data on
wages, earnings, and income, and the most important sources have been heavily
researched. Hence, I proceed under the assumption that the Krueger and Perri measures
of trends in wage and earnings inequality are accurate descriptions of reality.Comment • 123
1.1 SELF-INSURANCE AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONSUMPTION
INEQUALITY TO EARNINGS INEQUALITY
Consider the divergent paths of within-group earnings inequality (Figure
5) and within-group consumption inequality (Figure 8). The rise in
within-group earnings inequality reflects some combination of greater
dispersion in (the idiosyncratic components of) fixed earnings differences,
persistent earnings shocks, and transitory shocks. Fixed effects and per-
sistent shocks cannot be smoothed over the life cycle by borrowing and
lending. Hence, a perspective on the data informed by permanent income
theory leads one to anticipate a close relationship between persistent earn-
ings shocks and consumption responses. Many other theories that entail
incomplete sharing of consumption risks carry the same implication.
4
This implication finds support in the observed relationship between
group-level earnings shocks, which are highly persistent, and group-level
consumption responses. For example, Figure 5 and 8 show similar trend
increases in between-group earnings inequality and between-group con-
sumption inequality. Attanasio and Davis (1996) find that persistent
changes in relative wages among groups defined by birth cohort and edu-
cation lead to roughly equal-size changes in consumption expenditures.
Many studies show that household consumption expenditures are sensi-
tive to idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Two studies are especially pertinent
here. First, Gruber (1997) investigates how consumption responses to
unemployment vary with the generosity of unemployment insurance ben-
efits. To estimate this relationship, he exploits the fact that the income
replacement rates provided by unemployment benefits vary considerably
across states and workers. Gruber's study is noteworthy for our purposes
because the U.S. unemployment insurance system is not designed to insure
against persistent earnings shocks—benefits typically expire after 26 weeks.
So, insofar as the consumption response to unemployment varies with the
replacement rate, households are not smoothing transitory income varia-
tion. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1968 to 1987,
Gruber estimates that a 10-percentage-point rise in the replacement rate
reduces the unemployment-induced fall in food expenditures by about 3
percentage points. This is a big effect, and it implies a big departure from
effective self-insurance against transitory shocks. Gruber also notes that
there has been a secular decline in the generosity of unemployment benefits
4. In principle, a properly structured portfolio of risky financial assets can insure against
even the most persistent earnings shocks, but I am unaware of any evidence that house-
holds or their agents (e.g., pension fund managers) engage in this type of hedging behav-
ior to a significant extent. Davis and Willen (2000) develop a theory of life-cycle portfolio
choice with decision rules that exhibit this type of hedging behavior, and they present evi-
dence that broadbased equity and bond funds have some limited potential as instruments
for hedging occupation-level income shocks.124 • DAVIS
levels, which is a force for greater consumption inequality and increased
sensitivity of consumption inequality to earnings inequality.
Second, Sullivan (2002) investigates whether households use unsecured
debt to smooth consumption responses to unemployment spells. He relies
on panel data from the PSID for 1984 to 1993 and the Survey of Program
Participation for 1996 to 2000. Using a sample of unemployment spells
that aims to isolate transitory earnings shocks, he finds that households
with assets increase unsecured debt, on average, by about 10% of the
earnings loss associated with unemployment. For households with low
initial asset levels, however, unsecured debt does not respond to the
income loss associated with unemployment. These households account
for about 13 to 18% of the sample, depending on the definition of low
assets. In addition, Sullivan finds that the consumption response to unem-
ployment-induced income shocks is larger for households with lower
asset levels. He estimates that expenditure on food and housing for
households with little or no financial assets is five times more sensitive to
unemployment-induced earnings losses compared to other households.
The Gruber and Sullivan studies indicate that many households do not
effectively smooth transitory, idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Moreover,
there are strong theoretical reasons, supported by empirical evidence, to
think that households cannot smooth persistent earnings shocks. These
considerations provide grounds for skepticism toward the Krueger and
Perri evidence on consumption inequality trends, especially the decline in
within-group consumption inequality coupled with strong increases in
the within-group inequality of disposable earnings.
Conceivably, the effect of increased earnings inequality on within-group
consumption inequality is overwhelmed by greater smoothing of transitory
shocks. This interpretation is logically consistent, and it fits with the
increasing availability of consumer credit, but the interpretation faces at
least three problems. First, many households lack the financial means to
smooth earnings shocks. Poorer households, in particular, often have little
financial wealth, so they cannot draw on liquid assets to offset negative
earnings shocks. Second, most forms of consumer credit carry high interest
rates. Edelberg (2003, Table 1) reports mean consumer interest rates in 1998
of 8.0% per annum for first mortgages, 10.4% for second mortgages, 10.2%
on auto loans, 14.5% for credit cards, and 12.9% for other consumer credit.
Davis et al. (2003, Table 1) calculate that interest rates on unsecured forms
of consumer credit exceed the three-year Treasury rate by 6 to 9 percentage
points after netting out uncollected loan obligations. The high cost of con-
sumer credit makes borrowing less useful for consumption smoothing,
even when credit is available. The upshot of low financial wealth, incom-
plete access to credit markets, and high borrowing costs is that many house-
holds are poorly equipped to smooth even transitory earnings shocks.Comment • 125
Third, and perhaps most important, the effect of greater access to credit
markets or other self-insurance devices must be large to rationalize
Krueger and Perri's finding of a sharp divergence between within-group
earnings inequality and within-group consumption inequality. Suppose
that permanent shocks account for one-third of the rise in within-group
earnings inequality. On that account alone then, Figure 5 suggests a secu-
lar rise of 3 or 4 log points in the standard deviation of consumption within
groups. Instead, Figure 8 shows a decline of about 2 log points over the
sample period. The implied gap between trend changes in earnings and
consumption inequality is larger when we factor in a rising variance of
transitory earnings shocks. This gap will be hard to explain in a model that
matches the degree of consumption smoothing seen in the data.
1.2 CONCERNS ABOUT THE CE INTERVIEW SURVEY
The CE has two independent components, a quarterly Interview Survey
and a weekly Diary Survey, each with its own questionnaire and sample.
The two components differ, but overlap somewhat, in their coverage of
expenditure categories. The Interview Survey covers a broad range
of expenditure categories, but it is "designed to obtain data on the types
of expenditures respondents can recall for a period of 3 months or longer"
(www.bls.gov/cex/csxfaqs.htm). The Diary Survey focuses on frequently
purchased smaller items such as food and beverages, housekeeping sup-
plies, tobacco, nonprescription drugs, and personal-care products and
services. Sample size in the Diary Survey is roughly one-third that of the
Interview Survey. Following most previous research that uses CE micro
data, Krueger and Perri rely on the Interview Survey.
The CE records out-of-pocket expenditures. Even when combined, the
two CE components miss a big fraction of consumption (e.g., most health
care). There are large and growing discrepancies between expenditures in
the CE and Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCEs), as measured in
the national income and product accounts. For example, Battistin (2003,
Figure 1) reports a decline in the ratio of CE to PCE per-capita expendi-
tures on nondurables and services from 0.79 in 1985 to 0.63 in 2000.
5 The
CE-PCE gap and its growth over time are even larger when attention is
restricted to the Interview Survey. This can be seen in Slesnick's (2001)
Figure 3.2, which shows that the ratio of per-capita consumption in the CE
Interview Survey to the PCE declines from 0.08 in 1973 to 0.56 in 1995.
6
Slesnick (1992) investigates the discrepancy between CE and PCE con-
sumption measures. He finds that only one-half of the CE-PCE gap
5. The CE-based measure of per-capita consumption in Battistin appears to reflect both the
Interview and Diary surveys.
6. Slesnick confirms in a personal communication that his Figure 3.2 reflects CE data from
the Interview Survey only.126 • DAVIS
reflects differences between the two sources in the definition of consump-
tion, and the remaining half is unexplained. Underreporting in the CE (in
covered expenditure categories) appears to be a major problem. The time
period covered by Slesnick's study ends in 1989, after which the CE-PCE
gap grew much larger. Battistin (2003) provides evidence that the quality
of Interview Survey data on frequently purchased smaller items, house-
keeping supplies, and personal-care products and services has declined
over time, and that the decline has been "particularly accentuated" in the
1990s.
All of this leads me to question whether the CE provides a reliable
basis for drawing inferences about trends in consumption inequality.
Because the CE-PCE gap has expanded markedly over time, I am espe-
cially reluctant to accept Interview Survey evidence on consumption
inequality trends during the 1990s. Of course, the large and growing dis-
crepancy between CE and PCE consumption may partly reflect meas-
urement problems in the national income accounts. It seems highly
unlikely, however, that deterioration in the accuracy of the national
income accounts can account for such a dramatic widening of the CE-
PCE consumption gap.
1.3 CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY TRENDS IN OTHER DATA SOURCES
In light of my foregoing remarks, it seems appropriate to examine other
data sources for evidence on consumption inequality trends. I do so,
but my brief treatment merely scratches the surface of an important
issue.
Attanasio (2002) compares the evolution of consumption inequality in
the Interview and Diary Surveys. He plots the standard deviation of log
consumption per household and per adult-equivalent for the overall pop-
ulation and for selected cohort-education groups. He finds that overall
consumption inequality declines by about 2 log points from 1985 to 1998
in the Interview Survey, but it rises by 8 or 9 log points in the Diary
Survey. His within-group plots also show rising inequality in the Diary
Survey but flat or slightly declining inequality in the Interview Survey.
Battistin (2003) reports similar results in his detailed analysis of the dif-
ferences between the CE Diary and Interview Survey components. In
short, the CE Diary Survey paints a picture of rising consumption
inequality since 1985, in contrast to the flat or declining consumption
inequality seen in Krueger and Perri's Figures 6 and 8.
Fisher and Johnson (2003) report Gini coefficients for consumption per
adult-equivalent using data from the CE Interview Survey and the PSID.
They impute total consumption for households in the PSID based on food
expenditures, rent or mortgage, home ownership status and home value,Comment • 127
utility expenses, demographic and family composition variables, the age
and sex of the household head, and other variables. Table 1 reproduces
their statistics for overall consumption inequality. From 1984 to 1999, the
rise in overall consumption inequality is nearly twice as large in the PSID
as in the CE Interview Survey. Consumption inequality declines over the
1990s according to the Interview Survey, but it rises from 1990 to 1994 and
for the 1990s as a whole according to the PSID.
I also examined data on monthly food expenditures in the
Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII), which is
conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The CSFII is a
nationally representative sample with repeated cross sections for six
years: 1989 to 1991 and 1994 to 1996. The survey response rate in the
CSFII exceeds 85%, which compares favorably to CE response rates. See
Aguiar and Hurst (2003) for a detailed description of the CSFII and an
interesting analysis that exploits separate CSFII measures of food
expenditures and food consumption (e.g., caloric intake). I make use of
data on food expenditures only.
Following Krueger and Perri, I restrict my analysis sample to house-
holds with a head between 20 and 64 years of age. To measure "overall"
consumption inequality, I compute the 90-10 differential and the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals from yearly cross-sectional regressions of
log expenditures on controls for household size and a quartic polyno-
mial in the household head's age. I follow the same procedure to meas-
ure within-group consumption inequality, except that the regressions
also include dummy variables for the household head's education. For
between-group inequality, I report estimated coefficients on the educa-
tion variables.
As shown in Table 2, the CSFII shows a broad pattern of rising con-
sumption inequality from 1989 to the mid-1990s. Overall inequality in
food expenditures rises by about 8% from 1989 to 1996, within-group
inequality rises by a bit less, and the education differentials expand in
most cases.
Table 1 GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR CONSUMPTION PER ADULT













































Table 2 INEQUALITY IN LOG MONTHLY FOOD EXPENDITURES,
1989 TO 1996 (U.S. HOUSEHOLDS WITH A HEAD BETWEEN 20 AND 64
YEARS OF AGE)
A. Overall inequality (Controls for age of head and household size)




1989 1990 1991 1994 1995 1996
Log standard deviation
90-10 log differential
C. Between-group Log deviation from households with
inequality a college-educated head
Head with Head did not
Head with high school complete high
some college diploma school
1989-1991 pooled sample -.155 -.236 -.386
1994-1996 pooled sample -.135 -.243 -.404
Source: Author's calculations using data from the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals, U.S.
Department of Agriculture.
1. Food expenditures are the head's report of household expenditures in the previous month on food pur-
chased at the grocery store; food delivered into the home; and food purchased at restaurants, bars, cafe-
terias, and fast-food establishments.
2. All statistics are calculated from the "main sample" in the CSFII, a nationally representative sample of
noninstitutionalized persons residing in U.S. households. The CSFII is a repeated cross section for the
indicated years.
3. The analysis sample contains households with a head between 20 and 64 years of age and nonmissing
observations for food expenditures and years of completed schooling. I deleted four observations that
reported food expenditures in the previous month (in 1996 dollars) of less than $10.00, two of which
reported no expenditures. The resulting sample ranges from 1076 observations in 1990 to 1352 obser-
vations in 1996.
4. "Overall inequality" is computed from residuals in yearly cross-sectional regressions of log food expen-
ditures on controls for household size and a quartic polynomial in the head's age. "Within-group
inequality" is computed from residuals in a regression specification that also includes dummy variables
for the four indicated education categories. The log deviations reported under "Between-group
inequality" reflect the coefficients on the education variables for the same regression specification, but
also including year effects.
1. SUMMING UP
Krueger and Perri's characterization of consumption inequality trends is
difficult to reconcile with other evidence on consumption responses to
income shocks. Consumption measures based on the CE Interview
Survey show signs of deteriorating quality, and they cover a steadily
declining share of Personal Consumption Expenditures in the nationalComment • 129
income accounts. Three other sources of consumption data—the CE diary
survey, the PSID, and the CSFII—show rising consumption inequality
during the 1990s and are at odds with the message from the Interview
Survey.
7 These observations cast doubt on Krueger and Perri's basic char-
acterization of consumption inequality trends.
2. Calculating Welfare Consequences
2.1 SUMMARY OF THE KRUEGER AND PERRI PROCEDURE
It will be helpful to review the steps taken by Krueger and Perri in their
welfare analysis. First, they obtain residuals from yearly cross-sectional
regressions of log consumption on a constant and controls for the age and
race of the household reference person. Second, they regress these residu-
als on the schooling and sex of the reference person, again by year. For
each household-level observation, the second-stage regression expresses
consumption as the sum of a predicted value and a residual value. Third,
they sort predicted values into nine equal-size groups (each year). This
sorting defines the sex-education "groups" to which households belong.
Likewise, they sort residuals from the second-stage regressions into nine
equal-size groups, which determines the household's relative position
within its group.
Krueger and Perri then model the evolution of group-level and within-
group components as independent nine-state Markov chains. They allow
for time-varying states denoted by Yf and Yf and time-invariant transi-
tion matrices n
g and n
d, where g indexes the groups defined in the para-
graph above and d indexes the within-group position. They set Yf to the
median of the predicted values in group g at t, and they set the values for
Yt
d in the same way. To estimate the elements of the nine-by-nine transi-
tion matrices, n
g and n
d, they use sample average transition rates from
each state k to each state /.
The state vectors Yf and Yf, transition matrices n
g and n
d, and initial
conditions for group membership and within-group position determine a
stochastic path C for consumption. Given a utility function, the consump-
tion path yields a welfare value V(C). Altering one of the state vectors or
transition matrices yields a different consumption path C and a differ-
ent value V(C). We can express the difference between V (C) and V(C) in
consumption-equivalent terms by calculating the uniform percentage
consumption variation A such that V[(l + A)C] = V(C). The main welfare
7. The other sources of consumption data cover a much narrower range of expenditure cat-
egories than the Interview Survey, which could account for the discrepancy in consump-
tion inequality trends. This possibility merits careful investigation, but my other
observations in the main text suggest that there is more to the story.130 • DAVIS
experiment in Krueger and Perri's study involves a counterfactual path
for the state vectors Yt
8 and Yf. In particular, they generate C and V(C) by fix-
ing the state vectors at their 1972 values.
2.2 EVALUATING THE PROCEDURE
Calculations of this sort are potentially informative about the welfare
consequences of changes in the process for consumption or earnings, and
they can provide useful inputs into the analysis of inequality trends. The
general approach is attractive because it requires one to be explicit about
interpersonal and intertemporal utility comparisons, the economic envi-
ronment that agents face, and the counterfactual scenario. These features
facilitate communication and help to sharpen our thinking.
That said, the particular approach in this paper has important draw-
backs. First, Krueger and Perri do not adequately model uncertainty
about group-level consumption. They assume perfect foresight about the
evolution of the state vector Yt
8, so that uncertainty about group-level out-
comes stems entirely from nonzero off-diagonal elements of n
g. In the
data, the rank ordering of consumption (and earnings) for sex-education
groups is extremely stable over time. In fact, n
g is essentially an identity
matrix when estimated from data on households that have the same ref-
erence person in t and t + I.
8 Of course, when n
s is the identity matrix, ris-
ing inequality translates directly into higher utility for groups with rising
relative consumption and lower utility for those with declining relative
consumption. That is basically what Krueger and Perri find.
In practice, they do not limit the sample to households with the same
reference person in consecutive periods when estimating n
g. Instead, the
identity and characteristics of the reference person can change in their
sample, for example, because of a change in marital status or living
arrangement.
9 This type of uncertainty is what Krueger and Perri capture
in their specification of the group-level consumption and earnings
processes. It is not what leaps to mind when policymakers and
researchers ponder the welfare consequences of increased inequality
among education groups.
Second, it is unwise to rely solely on the short-panel aspect of the CE to
characterize uncertainty about group-level consumption and earnings.
We know that relative consumption and earnings among education
groups, for example, display large low-frequency movements, and that
there is much uncertainty about these movements looking ahead. The
8. The authors confirm this fact in a personal communication. When estimated using house-
holds with no change in reference person, the diagonal elements of n
g range from .95 to .98.
9. Their estimate of n
g has important off-diagonal elements, although the diagonal elements
remain large, ranging from .80 to .95.Comment • 131
panel aspect of the CE consists of two noisy observations, spaced nine
months apart, on the same household. Expecting such data to identify an
adequate statistical model for relative consumption movements among
education groups is probably expecting too much.
Moreover, there is no need to rely (solely) on the short-panel aspect of
the CE to estimate the group-level processes. Instead, one can exploit
repeated cross sections in the CE (or other data source) to construct syn-
thetic panel data on group-level outcomes. One can then follow groups
defined by birth cohort and education over a period of 20 years or more.
The long-panel aspect of such data makes them better suited for estimat-
ing the group-level processes, although nailing down the low-frequency
properties remains a challenge.
It would also be useful to combine the CE with longer panel data from
other sources to characterize the dynamics of the idiosyncratic compo-
nents of consumption and earnings. For example, one could use the PSID
to estimate the degree of persistence in idiosyncratic earnings or con-
sumption changes and combine that information with the household-
level changes observed in the CE. In this way, one could decompose
within-group inequality trends into separate components associated with
transitory and persistent household-level changes. See Blundell et al.
(2002) for an analysis that combines cross-sectional data in the CE with
panel data from the PSID.
To sum up, there are large gains from drawing on the information con-
tained in CE-based synthetic panels and longer true panels in other data
sources. This information can be used to provide richer, more compelling
characterizations of the consumption and earnings processes, which are
key inputs into the welfare calculations.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the welfare consequences of the increase in
inequality in the United States during the last three decades. By now, it
is well established that since the 1970s there has been a substantial
increase in inequality in wages and earnings. The focus of the empirical
literature has been to decompose this rise in inequality into transient
and permanent components. The motivation for this focus is that per-
manent shocks presumably have large welfare consequences, while
transient shocks are regarded as (self-)insurable. However, this link
between earnings and welfare implicitly requires assumptions about
market structure and excludes risk-sharing devices that do not show up
in wages or labor income (for example, in-kind transfers or means-
tested price rebates).
Krueger and Perri pursue a different approach for quantifying the wel-
fare costs of rising inequality by noting that welfare is not derived from
income and wages, but rather from consumption and leisure. In particu-
lar, Krueger and Perri ask the following two questions: (1) How has
inequality in consumption and leisure evolved? and (2) What are the wel-
fare consequences of these changes?Comment • 133
I am very sympathetic to Krueger and Perri's idea of exploring the
effects of rising inequality by putting more emphasis on allocations of
consumption and leisure, and I believe it is a promising research
approach.
Extending previous work (Krueger and Perri, 2002; Fernandez-
Villaverde and Krueger, 2002), Krueger and Perri document the first
question using data from the Consumption and Expenditure Survey
(CE). Next, they assess the welfare consequences using a novel
approach. In this discussion I compare some of their findings with facts
from alternative data. I then discuss two alternatives to Krueger and
Perri's approach for evaluating the welfare consequences of the rising
inequality.
2. Revisit Facts Using Alternative Data: PSID
The dataset that Krueger and Perri use, CE, focuses on consumption,
and data on earnings and hours are arguably of lower quality than in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or in the Current Population
Survey (CPS). However, Krueger and Perri document that the implica-
tions for wage inequality are comparable in the CE and other datasets
(PSID and CPS).
1
Using data from the PSID and CPS, Heathcote et al. (2003) document
that hours inequality for men (excluding nonparticipants) has remained
constant or experienced a small increase during this period. In contrast,
Krueger and Perri find that inequality in hours per adult (i.e., average
hours within the household) has declined over time.
One possible reason for this difference could be that even if all
workers worked the same number of hours, changes in labor force
participation (e.g., from one to two earners) would induce changes in
hours inequality. Thus, the rise in female labor force participation
may have caused the decline in hours inequality because of an
increase in the average number of hours worked for women. Indeed,
the number of hours worked for married women has increased during
this period.
2
1. Krueger and Perri argue that earnings inequality increases slightly less than wage inequal-
ity. If inequality is measured as the variance of log of earnings (instead of as the standard
deviation of logs), however, earnings inequality increases slightly more (consistent with
the finding of Heathcote et al. [2003] for the PSID).
2. Using data from the CPS, Jones et al. (2003) document that, while average hours worked
for single men and women was relatively constant over this period, hours worked for
married women rose sharply.134 • STORESLETTEN
3. Welfare Effects of Rising Inequality
Given the facts on the evolution of consumption and hours inequality,
Krueger and Perri examine the distribution of welfare effects of changes
in inequality, conditional on initial state. They propose a novel, theory-free
approach. They start by estimating an exogenous stochastic process for
individual household consumption and leisure, exploiting the panel
dimension in the CE data.
3 The data are detrended so that the welfare
effects of changes in the process are due to changes in the higher-order
moments only. They then assume a time-separable utility function over
consumption, consumer durables, and leisure,
and compute discounted utility given the time-varying processes for con-
sumption and leisure.
The large dispersion in welfare effects are mainly driven by changes in
between-group inequality and are hardly affected by changes in within-
group inequality. One reason is that, conditional on group, the estimated
processes for consumption and leisure are not very persistent. For exam-
ple, holding group-specific characteristics constant, the autocorrelation
of individual consumption is 0.72, lower than the autocorrelation for
earnings.
This finding points, I believe, to a potential shortcoming of the Krueger
and Perri approach. Assume that preferences are separable between con-
sumption and leisure. The permanent income hypothesis then suggests
that the marginal utility of consumption, and therefore consumption
itself, should be very persistent. Why don't the data have this property?
Of course, preferences may not be separable between consumption and
leisure. However, there are good reasons to believe that the estimated per-
sistence of consumption is biased downward due to measurement error.
For example, Cogley (2002) suggests that measurement error in CE con-
sumption biases upward the variance in individual consumption growth
by one order of magnitude. Clearly, if the Krueger and Perri consumption
process is mismeasured, it casts some doubt on their quantitative welfare
findings.
3. Note that it is not the transition process between actual consumption levels that is esti-
mated, but the transition probabilities between different consumption classes. This
approach underestimates the consumption inequality and, in particular, the change in
consumption inequality.Comment • 135
4. Alternative Route (i): A Theory-Free Approach
If one is to pursue a data-based, theory-free approach, why is it neces-
sary to estimate a process for consumption and leisure instead of sim-
ply plugging in the actual data? In the spirit of Atkinson (1970), one
could alternatively address the following welfare question: Under the
veil of ignorance, what fraction of initial consumption would agents
give up to get that allocation forever, relative to experiencing the sub-
sequent evolution of inequality in consumption and leisure? Assuming
that preferences are time-separable, it is only the dispersion in con-
sumption and leisure that matters, and movements within the distribu-
tion are irrelevant. Thus, one could simply plug in the actual data
observations and discount utility, given explicit assumptions about the
utility function.
Pursuing this approach with the same data and utility function as
Krueger and Perri used, the welfare losses, expressed as a fraction of life-












The first column refers to the welfare effects of the changes in inequal-
ity of nondurable consumption. The second and third columns add
leisure and services from consumer durables. The key message of this list
is that the average welfare loss is around 1 to 2%, which is in the same
ballpark as the findings of Krueger and Perri.
5. Alternative Route (ii): A Structural Approach
The most serious critique of the Krueger and Perri approach is perhaps
that the preferences are arbitrary because they are not necessarily con-
sistent with the observed individual behavior. For example, the prefer-
ences considered by Krueger and Perri exhibit quite high individual
labor elasticity (2 for a = 1 and % for o = 2). There are reasons to believe
that the costs of changing inequality have been unevenly distributed
across generations, with young in the 1980s shouldering the largest bur-
den, an aspect absent in the infinite-horizon approach of Krueger and
Perri.
4. The figures display the welfare loss of the changes in inequality after 1980 because the
1972-1973 CE data include fewer consumption items than the 1980-2000 data and are
therefore not directly comparable.136 • STORESLETTEN
An alternative route, pertinent for this criticism, would be to pursue a
structural approach for quantifying the welfare costs. In particular, one
could use an individual-specific wage or earnings process as a primitive,
generate endogenous consumption and leisure allocations from a struc-
tural model, and subsequently use these findings to evaluate welfare con-
sequences.
One paper pursuing this route is Heathcote et al. (2003). They estimate
changes in the individual wage process in the United States using PSID
data and document increases in the transitory, persistent, and permanent
components of the wage process. They then formulate a standard life-
cycle version of the permanent income hypothesis model with savings in
one riskless bond and a consumption-leisure trade-off. The preferences
are of the constant elasticity of substitution type and separable in time
and between consumption and leisure. Their model is calibrated to cap-
ture key cross-sectional facts, resulting in quite plausible parameters (for
example, a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 and a relative risk aversion for con-
sumption of 1.5).
5 This model accounts for the salient features of the evo-
lution in inequality, such as the evolution of the wage-hours correlation
and the inequality in earnings, consumption, and hours. The fact that the
preferences are consistent with the observed individual behavior makes
the welfare calculation (including the particular utility function) less arbi-
trary, I believe.
Turning to welfare, Heathcote et al. (2003) find that, under the veil of
ignorance but conditional on cohort, the welfare loss of changes in wage
process is 2 to 5% of lifetime consumption for households entering the job
market during 1970-2000, and around 1% for households entering the
job market during the 1950s.
6
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Discussion
Fabrizio Perri first responded to some of the discussion participants' con-
cerns about data quality. He was aware of the fact that using different
datasets produced different estimates of the increase in wage inequality in
the sample period. He asserted that, although the estimates from the
Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey are bigger than those obtained using
the Current Population Survey (CPS), they are similar to those obtained
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Perri said that he was
aware of the differences between the income and diary data from the CE,
and said that the authors might consider using the diary data in the
future. He also said that he was aware of the underreporting of both con-
sumption and income in the CE. He also noted that as long as the income
and consumption data come from the same sample, income inequality
increases while consumption inequality remains flat. On the question of
the identifiability of the stochastic process for between-group inequality,
Perri agreed that using 1-year variation is not ideal. He pointed out that a
large number of households are used to make the estimate, however, and
that the results are not very different from what would be expected.
Annamaria Lusardi echoed the concerns of Steve Davis about the
severity of measurement error in the CE. Responding to Steve Davis's
comment that the CE and National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
data do not match, she suggested that it is not obvious that the NIPA has
the correct numbers. Fabrizio Perri responded that a big difference
between the CE and the NIPA is that the CE does not include data on
very rich people.
Annamaria Lusardi suggested that counting services from durables
might yield a higher volatility of consumption. Eva Nagypal was con-
cerned that the authors did not take account of the increase in assortative
matching of spouses along observable characteristics over the sample
period.
Several participants were concerned by the smoothness of the con-
sumption data and suggested investigating this point further by examin-
ing the data on savings more closely. Annamaria Lusardi asked whether
both savings and wealth data are consistent with the degree of consump-
tion smoothing apparent in the data. She noted that wealth inequality
increased a good deal in the 1990s. Deborah Lucas remarked that the138 • Discussion
authors hypothesize that the disconnect between consumption and
income may be facilitated through financial markets. She was worried by
the fact that the group that would have had to use financial markets to
increase their consumption had almost no savings in the data and found
this particularly troubling in light of the persistence of income shocks.
Aart Kraay was struck by the fact that those in the bottom decile of sav-
ings rates in the data used in the paper had an average dissaving rate of
10% over 15 to 30 years. He wondered whether dissaving of this order of
magnitude could be consistent with what is known about initial asset
stocks. On the issue of savings rates, Fabrizio Perri responded that it was
true that the gap in the savings rate widened over the sample period.
However, he pointed out that the households in the bottom decile of sav-
ings rates in one year were not necessarily the same as the households in
the bottom decile in other years because households with temporarily low
realizations of income dissave, while those with temporarily high realiza-
tions save.
On the issue of the measurement of welfare, Fabrizio Perri reminded
the participants that the welfare numbers in the paper are ex-post num-
bers. He noted that they answer the question, How bad has bad luck been
for unlucky people? not How much would people have been prepared to
pay in 1972 to avoid the future change in their income process? Jonathan
Heathcote suggested using a welfare measure based on the assumptions
of a utilitarian social-welfare function and separability over time and
across consumption and leisure because this measure would require look-
ing at the cross-section distribution of consumption and leisure alone.
Fabrizio Perri responded that the welfare losses of increased inequality
calculated in this way would be small because the increases in inequality
in consumption and hours worked are small.
Mark Gertler speculated that there might be a link between the jump in
between-group and within-group inequality around 1984 documented in
the paper and the decline in macroeconomic volatility at that time docu-
mented by James Stock and Mark Watson in the Macroeconomics Annual
2002. Fabrizio Perri suggested that credit market changes could explain
the smoothness of consumption relative to income and potentially also
the decrease in macro volatility. Ken Rogoff pointed out that the improve-
ment in credit markets was specific to the United States, whereas the
decline in macroeconomic volatility was common to many developed
countries. Fabrizio Perri pointed to the finding of Alberto Alesina and co-
authors that inequality affects happiness in Europe but not in the United
States as potential evidence that credit markets are less effective in facili-
tating consumption smoothing in Europe than in the United States.